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The Affirmative Duty to Integrate in
Higher Education
I. Introduction
In the sixteen years since Brown v. Board of Education,' there has
been an evolutionary expansion of the duty to desegregate state ele-
mentary and secondary school systems once segregated by law. Southern
higher education, however, is today marked by racial separation and by
a general inferiority of the historically Negro colleges. This Note will
consider whether the Supreme Court's holding in Green v. School Board
of New Kent County, Virginia2 has any implications for higher educa-
tion. The specific questions to be answered are: (1) since there is still
a racially identifiable dual system of public higher educational institu-
tions in the South, do the states have a duty to take affirmative steps
(beyond establishing racially nondiscriminatory admissions policies) to
encourage integration; and (2) if such a duty exists, how do the current
circumstances of higher education condition the scope of duty and the
remedies which courts may enforce? The need for standards8 to measure
a state's compliance with Brown in higher education is particularly
acute because the Office of Civil Rights for the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare has required several states4 to submit plans
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Brown I]. The second Brown decision, on
the question of relief, appears at 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Brown 1I].
2. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Green].
3. The desegregation regulations for elementary and secondary education, 45 C.1,.R.
§§ 181.1-181.7 (1968), promulgated by HEWt under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1961,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d, are extensive and detailed, but those applying specifically to higher ed.
ucation are extremely brief and extend mainly to providing assurance of compliance with
present and future HEW regulations attaching to any program in which the college or 1nt-
versity participates, 45 C.F.R. § 80(a) (1968). The only present regulation relating specifically
to higher education prohibits racial discrimination in "admissions practices and . , all
other practices relating to treatment of students," 45 C.F.R. § 80.4(d)(1) (1968). Only four
colleges have had federal funds terminated for refusing to submit assurances of col.
pliance, and none have had funds terminated for discriminatory admissions practices.
Leeson, Desegregation: Checking on Compliance, 3 SouTrm ED. REP., April, 1968, at
37, 38.
4. In early 1969, HEW required such plans from Pennsylvania, Maryland, Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Arkansas. N.Y. Times, March 11, 1969, at 22, col. 5. See generally, Pres-
sure on State Colleges to Integrate, U.S. Naws & WoRLD REPORT, March 81, 1969, at 82.
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showing how they will further integration in their colleges and univer-
sities, but HEW has given no criteria by which the plans will be judged."
A. Evolution of the Affinmative Duty to Integrate
in ElementarylSeconda y Education
The evolutionary expansion of the duty to desegregate in elementary/
secondary education is the product both of the Supreme Court's hazy
initial definition of the requirements of Brown I and of active Southern
resistance to desegregation in any form. In the Brown II decision on
the question of relief, the Supreme Court emphasized the varied prob-
lems facing individual school districts and declined to propose a gen-
eral standard by which compliance with Brown I could be measured.o
Instead, the Court remanded the four cases before it and directed that
the lower courts guide themselves by "equitable principles" in fashion-
ing ad hoc decrees which would ensure the admission of the plaintiffs
to public schools "as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis."--
Just a month and a half later, a serious ambiguity in Brown II became
evident. The Supreme Court had declared that the plaintiffs were to be
admitted to public school "on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with
all deliberate speed." s In Briggs v. Elliott,9 one of the three cases re-
5. In a farch 3, 1969 letter to David Kurtzman, Pennsylvania State Superintendent of
Public Instruction, Soloman Arbeiter, Higher Education Coordinator in HEW's Office of
Civil Rights, noted that while Cheney State College had a student body that was 83%
Negro, Pennsylvania's other state colleges and Indiana University had a student enroll-
ment that was approximately 99% white. The letter continued:
To fulfill the purposes and intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is not sufficient
that an institution maintain a nondiscriminatory admissions policy if the student
population continues to reflect the former racial identification of the institution. This
appears to be the situation at all of the institutions reviewed and, therefore, these
institutions must discharge their affirmative duty by adopting measures that will re-
sult in desegregation as soon as administratively possible.
A desegregation plan was required of the state within 120 days, but minimal standards
by which the plan would be judged were not provided. Copy of letter on file at Yale
Law Journal office. HEW seems uncertain what it can legall)y require of a state when
racial isolation persists in higher education despite nondiscriminatory admissions policies,
and this indecision is particularly acute with respect to the Negro colleges. Peter Libasi,
former head of HEW's OCR has candidly admitted, "I don't know what to do about
the Negro colleges .... I don't think a Title VI enforcement program is the means of
resolving basic policy issues." Leeson, Desegregation: Cheding on Compliance, 3 SoutISoa
ED. REP., April, 1968, at 37, 38.
6. The vagueness of the Brown II standards were widely criticized in the South and
elsewhere. Shortly after the decision, the Richmond Times-Dispatch dedared:
It would have been desirable if the court had ... specified the abolition of segrega-
tion by stages or steps, with, say, 10 per cent eliminated the first year after the decrees
became effective, 40 per cent two years later, perhaps, and the remaining 50 per cent
some years after that. In this way, all uncertainty as to the timing and method of the
tremendous shift would have been eliminated at once.
Quoted in Muse, The South's Troubled Years, 4 SoutmEN ED. REP., June, 1969, at 19.
7. 349 US. at 300.
8. 349 U.S. at 301.
9. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
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manded with Brown, a South Carolina district court interpreted the
state's duty under Brown II as merely a passive one:
[The Supreme Court] has not decided that the states must mix
persons of different races in the schools or must require them to
attend schools or must deprive them of the right of choosing the
schools they attend. What it has decided, and all that it has decided,
is that a state may not deny to any person on account of race the
right to attend any school that it maintains .... The Constitution,
in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids
discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the
result of voluntary action.1 0
This distinction between "integration" and "desegregation" was widely
approved and followed."'
During the 1954-1968 period, the Supreme Court expressed frequent
dissatisfaction with the dilatory nature of the implementation of deseg-
regation under this and other standards, 12 and through the 1960's, the
Court's opinions in cases involving elementary and secondary school
desegregation grew shorter and more peremptory. In a 1964 case which
stemmed from the Brown I litigation, the Court asserted that "[t]he
time for 'deliberate speed' has run out,"' 3 and a year later declared,
"[d]elays in desegregating school systems are no longer tolerable." 14
Finally, in May, 1968, the Court gave what would seem to be its final
clarification of the Brown II decision for elementary and secondary
school systems.15 The Court held the freedom-of-choice plan of New
Kent County, Virginia, unconstitutional because it was not effectively
10. 132 F. Supp. at 777.
11. See Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School Dist., 241 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.), ccrt.
denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957); Kelley v. Ed. of Educ., 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 924 (1959); Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Ed. of Edue., 333 F.2d 55 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964).
In 1966, the Fifth Circuit declared this distinction invalid: "Expression in our earlier
opinions distinguishing between integration and desegregation must yield to this affirma-
tive duty [to establish a nonracial unitary school system] we now recognize." United Statel
v. Jefferson County ld. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (1966), afi d on rehearing with modifications,880 F.2d 885. 889 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 889 U.S. 840 (1967).
12. Reluctant federal enforcement was compounded with active Southern resistance
which took the form of school closings, tuition grants to private schools, pupil placementplans, pupil transfer privileges, freedom of choice plans, and repeal of compulsory atten-
dance laws; this story has been well documented elsewhere. See A. Bickel, The Decade ofSchool Desegregation, in roLITlcs AND THE VARR N COURT -48 (1965); R. SAaUAT8r, T(I
ORDEAL OF DESEGREGATION: THE FroST DECADE (1966); 1R. Carter, The Warren Court andaDesegregation, 67 Mac. L. R v. 287 (1968).
1-. Griffin v. County School Ed., 877 U.S. 218, 284 (1964).
14. Bradley v. School Bd., 882 U.S. 108, 105 (1965).
15. The Court considered three companion cases: Green (ineffective frecdom.of.itolce
plan); Raney v. Ed. of Educ., 891 U.S. 448 (1968) (ineffective freedom-of-choice plan)-
Monroe v. Ed. of Commr's, 891 U.S. 450 (1968) (ineffective free transfer plan).
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abolishing the dual system: 1' the two county public schools were still
identifiably white and black.' 7 In tracing the history of the Brown deci-
sions, the Court emphasized that the goal of a racially nondiscriminatory
school system did not simply mean a system where black children coura-
geous enough to break with tradition were afforded a place in a white
school.' Instead, the goal was complete integration, achievement of a
"unitary, nonracial system of public education."' 0 In public elementary
and secondary school systems, this was to be the only standard by which
the state's fulfillment of its Equal Protection Clause duty not to dis-
criminate on the basis of race would be measured. Actual racial mixing
of school children was the true indication of compliance with Brown,
and if a desegregation plan was not achieving this result, the school
board was under an affirmative duty to try some more effective method. -0
Unlike the constitutionally more difficult problem of de facto segrega-
tion, the presently existing dual system of public education in the South
is a direct product of state action; despite present admissions stan-
dards, the segregated enrollment pattern existing today has descended
without interruption from previous de jure segregation.
B. "Equality" in Higher Education under the
Separate-but-Equal Standard
Although the Brown cases involved elementary/secondary education,
the Supreme Court had first begun giving real content to the "equal"
part of the separate-but-equal doctrine2' in the field of higher education.
Beginning in 1938, the pre-Brown cases on higher education show a
gradual evolution of greater stringency in the requirements imposed
upon the states as the Court reluctantly began to examine the quality
16. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968). The Court noted that the
"first step" taken by the School Board, institution of the freedom-of-choice plan. did not
occur until eleven years after Brown I: "[T]his deliberate perpetuation of the unconsti-
tutional dual system can only have compounded the harm of such a system., 391 US. at
438.
17. In the three years of the freedom-of-choice plan's operation, not a single white
child chose to attend the Negro school. Although 115 black children had enrolld in the
white school in 1967, 85% of the black children in the system still attended the all-Negro
school. "mhe plan has operated simply to burden children and their parents with a
responsibility whickBrown II placed squarely on the School Board." 391 U.S. at 441.
18. 391 US. at 435.
19. 391 US. at 436.
20. 391 U.S. at 437-38. See also Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., - US. -,
90 S.Ct. 29 (1969).
21. This doctrine was announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which up-
held a Louisiana statute requiring the assignment of passengers on the basis of color to
segregated railway carriages and applied to public schools in Cumming v. Bd. of Educ.,
175 U.S. 528 (1899). In 1908, the Court upheld the conviction of Berea College for violation
of a Kentucky statute which forbade interracial education by "any person, corporation, or
association of persons." Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
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of the "equality" provided blacks in education. 2 In the first of these
cases, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,2 3 the Court held that a Missouri
statute allowing the state to pay the tuition of black graduate students
at graduate schools in adjacent states was an unconstitutional denial of
those students' rights to equal educational facilities. Lloyd Gaines was
held to have the personal right to a legal education within the state
borders which was "substantially equal"24 to that provided by the state
for its white students. 25 In two later cases, however, the Court was forced
to wrestle with more difficult questions about the meaning of "equality"
under the Plessy standard. In Sweatt v. Painter o2 the Court held that
petitioner had been denied his right to an "equal" education because
the white University of Texas Law School was superior to the Negro
Texas State University in terms of faculty, curriculum, library, and
availability of law review and similar activities. More importantly, the
Court continued, the University of Texas Law School possessed to a
far greater degree "those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school," such as
reputation of faculty, experience of the administration, position and
influence of the alumni, standing in the community, tradition, and
prestige.2 7 In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,2 s a black graduate
22. In education, the "equality" called for by the Plessy rule quickly became a casu
alty of separateness. See Cumming v. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899), Reynolds v. Bd.
of Educ., 66 Kan. 672, 72 P. 274 (1903); Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. 180, 126 P. 273 (1912).
See generally Annotation, Equivalence of educational facilities extended by public school
system to members of white and members of colored race, 103 A.L.R. 713 (1936), and
Separate-but-Equal: A Study of the Career of a Constitutional Concept, I RA c RrL, L.
RE'. 283 (1956). In reviewing the history of Tennessee's segregated system of public educa-
tion, Judge Gray stated: "The races were certainly kept separate in the schools, but I
would assume that no one would argue in good faith that the schools were equal."
Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937, 939 (M.D. Tenn. 1968). For a description of
Southern higher education under the separate-but-equal standard, see U.S. CoMlussIoN
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL PaoaCION OF THE LAws IN Punauc HIom EDUCAOrIO 2-48 (1960).
23. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
24. 305 U.S. at 351. There is a chilling aftermath to the Gaines case which illustrates
the dangers faced by early litigants who challenged the separate-but-equal system. After
the Supreme Court decision, the Missouri legislature appropriated $200,000 to establish
a special law school for Gaines at Lincoln University (Gaines' alma mater). Gaines dal-
lenged the adequacy of the hastily assembled facilities before the state supreme court,
and the court remanded the case to the circuit court for the taking of evidence, State
cx rel. Gaines v. Canada, 344 Mo. 1238, 131 S.W.2d 217 (1939). When the time came for
Gaines to testify, however, his attorneys announced that he had disappeared and could
not be located. To this day, his fate is unknown. See Bluford, The Lloyd Gaines Story,
22 J. En. SOCIOLOGY 242 (1958).
25. Similarly, the Court's decision in Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), was
grounded upon the fact that the state of Oklahoma was providing a law school for white
students but-none for Negroes. Citing Gaines, the Court held that mandamus would lie
to compel the admission of a black applicant to the state's only law school.
26. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). -
27. 339 U.S. at 634. The Court also noted that education at Texas State would not be
substantially equal to education at Texas because Sweatt would be deprived of the oppor-
tunity to meet over 85% of the future members of the Texas bar. Id. at 634. Sweatt was
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student admitted to a white graduate school of education sued to remove
the segregated conditions under which he was forced to study.29 The
Court held such conditions unconstitutional because they handicapped
McLaurin in his pursuit of effective graduate education by impairing
his ability to study and to enter into discussions with his fellow students.
When the separate-but-equal doctrine was overruled by Brown I, the
duty of a state to maintain a racially nondiscriminatory admissions
policy was quickly extended to higher educationcO In fact, it was held
that the "all deliberate speed" principle of Brown II did not apply to
graduate31 or undergraduate education 32 since such decrees did not
"present the problems of [decrees in] elementary and secondary educa-
tion."3
3
C. The Role of the Courts in Higher Education:
I Am Curious, Green
The post-Brown state of integration in higher education is illustrated
by two recent cases. In Alabama State Teachers Association v. Alabama
Public School and College Authority,34 a black teachers organization
sought to enjoin a $5,000,000 bond sale for construction of a four year
degree-granting branch of Auburn University in Montgomery, Al-
abama, alleging that the state's action was unconstitutional because it
would perpetuate the dual system in higher education. The plaintiffs
argued that since the state had historically maintained a dual system
that was still in existence (though no longer supported by law), the
precedents from elementary/secondary education cases imposed on the
state an affirmative duty to dismantle this system by expanding predom-
followed in McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F.2d 949 (4th Cir. 1951), when the Fourth Cir-
cuit used a comparative analysis similar to the Supreme Court's and found the Negro
North Carolina College Law School greatly inferior to the white University of North
Carolina Law School in terms of curriculum, ability and reputation of faculty, accredita-
tion, law review activities, library facilities, physical plant, and general educational ad-
vantages; it ordered Floyd McKissick admitted to the University of North Carolina Law
School.
28. 339 US. 637 (1950).
29. McLaurin was required to sit apart at a designated desk adjoining the classroom,
to sit at a specified desk on the library mezzanine, and to sit at a special table and eat
at a different time from other students in the school cafeteria. 339 U.S. at 640. Such inte-
grated isolation did not disappear with Brown I; James Meredith was to say of his enistence
at the University of Mississippi in 1962-63: "l was the most segregated Negro in the
world." Quoted in P. SAuitxTr, TBE ORDEA OF DESmREG nON 132 (196).
30. Frasier v. Bd. of Trustees of the University of North Carolina. 184 F. Supp. 5S9
(M.D. N.C.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 979 (1955); Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955).
31. Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control of Florida, 350 U.S. 413 (1956).
32. Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343, 352 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (192).
33. Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control of Florida, 350 U.S. 413 (1956).
34. 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 400 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as ASTA].
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inantly black Alabama State College in Montgomery instead of con-
structing another branch of a predominantly white institution. Noting
that "[t]his argument presents a case of first impression," Judge Johnson
denied the relief requested, stating that he was "reluctant . . . to go
much beyond preventing discriminatory admissions" and that his court
did not "agree that the scope of the duty should be extended as far in
higher education as it has been in the elementary and secondary public
schools area."85 The court's language is imprecise because while osten-
sibly recognizing an "affirmative duty" to dismantle the dual system,
it asserts that this duty can be satisfied by a non-discriminatory admis-
sions policy.36
In Sanders v. Ellington, 7 faculty members and students of predom-
inantly black Tennessee A & I University, located in Nashville, brought
a class action to enjoin expansion of the University of Tennessee's Nash-
ville Center because, they alleged, it would continue to be a predom-
inantly white institution. Enrollment at Tennessee A & I was 99%
black while the other state universities were 89% white. The United
States intervened on the side of the plaintiffs and sought, additionally,
to compel the state to present a plan which was designed to produce
significant integration throughout Tennessee's public colleges and uni-
versities. The defendants argued that the two institutions would be
complementary, since the Center would offer evening courses in en-
gineering, business administration, liberal arts, and education, while
Tennessee A & I would offer approximately the same courses during
the daytime. Accepting the defendants' argument, the court found that
expansion of the Nashville Center would not necessarily perpetuate
the dual system and denied the injunction. However, the court specif.
ically refused to base its holding on the ASTA case. Green was cited for
the proposition that the state did have an affirmative duty38 to dismantle
the dual system of higher education which, the court found, still existed
in Tennessee despite racially non-discriminatory admissions policies.
The court recognized that such policies did not meet the state's affirma.
tive duty: "Nothing has been shown in the record to indicate that any
plan has been proposed, devised, or considered to lead to the desegrega-
35. 289 F. Supp. at 787 (emphasis in original).
36. 289 F. Supp. at 789. The equation of "affirmative duty" and "nondiscriminatory ad-
missions policy" is incorrect and misleading. Maintenance of non-discriminatory policies
was the original command of Brown I; the Green concept of affirmative duty Implies
imposition of further requirements in order to achieve integration.
37. 288 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
38. The court noted, however, that the Supreme Court "has not attempted to fashion
a comprehensive definition of what that duty requires." 288 F. Supp. at 942.
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tion of [Tennessee A 8- I] except the naked fact of an open-door
policy." 39 The state was given a "substantial amount of time" to submit
a plan showing how it would fulfill this duty.40
Since the Sanders case was decided, however, the Supreme Court has
summarily affirmed the decision in the ASTA case.41 Justice Douglas
interpreted this action as holding that a state has no affirmative duty
to desegregate a dual system of higher education and dissented strongly.
He saw the case as governed by Green and rejected as "amazing" the
suggestion that different standards applied to higher education. - Be-
cause the majority did not issue an opinion, however, it is difficult to
ascertain the grounds of its affirmance. It is possible that ASTA did not
adequately establish that construction of the white Auburn branch
would perpetuate segregated attendance patterns or that an alternate
construction project at black Alabama State would ensure integration.
II. Problem
A. Segregation in Higher Education Today
Sixteen years after Brown I, higher education in the South, like
elementary and secondary education, still presents a bleak picture of
racial separation.43 During 1967-68, the last school year for which a
survey was taken, 74.0%" of the black students in public institutions
of higher education in the seventeen states4 where segregation was
39. 288 F. Supp. at 942.
40. 288 F. Supp. at 940.
41. 393 U.S. 400 (1969).
42. 393 U.S. at 401.
43. In June, 1969, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of the Department of Health. Ed-
ucation, and Welfare estimated that approximately 20.3% of Southern black children
were attending elementary and secondary schools with enrollments that were at least 50%
white. Muse, The South's Troubled Years, 4 SoUrraNH EN. REP., June, 1969 at 17. For an
extensive analysis of segregation, both de jure and de facto, in the nation's public ele-
mentary and secondary school system, see U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLA-
TION IN THE PUBLIC ScHooLs, vols. I and II (1967).
44. U.S. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SURVEY OF HIGHER EDUCATION 1967-68 (1967), quoted
in Leeson, Desegregation: Checking on College Compliance, 3 Sotmn.En. Rn., April.
1968 at 41. In 1967-68, 1,180,694 whites and 126,939 blacks attended public colleges and
universities in these states, so this 74.0% figure represents approximately 93,935 black
students. Id. A comprehensive list of Negro colleges and universities in the United States
appears in E. McGRA'r, THE PREDoMINANTLY NEGRO COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES IN TRAN-
srrIoN 172-177 (1965) [hereinafter cited as McGRATH]. According to McGrath, there are 49
public universities, colleges, and junior colleges founded for Negroes in the seventeen
Southern and border states, one in Pennsylvania, and one in Ohio; in the United States,
there are 74 such institutions which are private. Id.
45. These states were Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Lou-
isiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. The District of Columbia also maintained a
segregated system of public schools. U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS CoMMIOssN, EQUAL PrOT=coN OF
THE LAWS IN HIGHER EDUCATION xii 11.7 (1960).
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legally enforced in 1954 were in colleges and universities established by
law for Negroes46 and still overwhelmingly black in enrollment. Even
this statistic does not accurately portray the severity of racial isolation
in the deep South. In Mississippi, the percentage of black public college
students in Negro public colleges is 92.4%, in Georgia 90.6%, in Al-
abama 90.2%, in Virginia 89.3%, and in South Carolina 85.9%.47 Re-
verse integration has been almost imperceptible in the deep South; a
1969 survey of the twelve Negro land grant colleges in this area revealed
that full time white undergraduates comprised .3% of the undergraduate
enrollment of these institutions.48 This survey concluded:
Desegregation in state universities-and in the rest of higher educa-
tion-has been talked about, declared, implied, and assumed to be
substantial for several years. On the basis of [present] data ... it
seems fair to conclude that desegregation in these institutions has,
in fact, been largely token.49
The history behind these statistics indicates an even greater failure
to abolish the dual system than has occurred in elementary/secondary
education. It was in higher education that the judicial erosion of sep-
arate-but-equal began,50 and the Brown decisions themselves cited many
of these cases. Neither Brown nor any of the cases that followed it
specifically exempted higher education from the requirements imposed
in lower education; both Brown and Green speak only of "public
education." 51 Ironically, many courts have held that there is an even
more urgent need to desegregate white institutions of higher education
than white elementary/secondary schools because black students desir-
ing admission are "of mature age" and "are about to engage in the
serious business of adult life."52 And, as previously noted, the "with all
46. Many of these institutions are still statutorily designed as "Negro" or "colored",
see TENN. CoDE ANN., tit. 49 § 3205 (1966); LA. REV. STAT., tit. 17, § 10 (1963).
47. For the remaining Southern states, the percentages arc: North Carolina-80.8%,
Louisiana-81.8%; Arkansas-79.6%; Tennessee-77.4%; Texas-56.5%; Florida-54.3%.
Similar figures for the border states are: District of Columbia-94.3%/(; Dclawarc-.86.2%;,,
Maryland-65.8%; Oklahoma-34.3 ; Kentucky-3.5%; Missouri-0.0; West Virginia-
0.0%. Leeson, supra note 46, at 40.
48. Survey conducted jointly by the Southern Education Reporting Service and the
National Association of State Universities and Land.grant Colleges, reported in 3. Egerton,
A Survey of State Universities: Almost All-White, 4 Sournnw ED. REP., May, 1969 at 2 ift.
The same survey revealed that less than 2% of the students in the nation's state colleges
and universities Were black. Id. at 5.
49. The survey continued: "The conclusion that black Americans are grossly under
represented in higher education seems inescapable." Quoted in New York Times, May 18,
1969, p. 1, col. 3.
50. See pp. 669-71 supra.
51. Brown I: "[In the field of public education, ... 'separate but equal' has no
place." 347 U.S. at495. Green: "The transition to a unitary non.racial system of public
education was and is the ultimate end to be brought about." 391 U.S. at 434.
52. Frasier v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of North Carolina, 134 F. Supp. 589, 692-95
(M.D.N.C. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 979 (1956).
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deliberate speed" principle of Brown II has been held not to apply to
higher education 53 since the administrative problems of elementary/
secondary education are not present there.54
B. The Emperor's Clothes: Quality of Public Negro
Colleges in the South
Racial separation is exacerbated by the fact that the public Negro
colleges and universities are, on the average, greatly inferior to their
white counterparts. Riesman and Jencks concluded that these colleges
were "by almost any standard ... academic disaster areas."05 Their study
described the Negro colleges as characterized by inadequate operating
budgets, high drop out rates, low student SAT scores, low faculty salaries,
few faculty PhD's, inadequate science facilities, and a paucity of adult ex-
tension programs.5 6 Riesman and Jencks added the subjective conclusion
that such colleges were also marked by academic parochialism, student in-
curiosity, faculty incompetence, and general intellectual torpor.0r The
Coleman Report analyzed the public Negro colleges in terms of thirteen
comparative factors;58 many inadequacies were noted, but the deficien-
cies of "compelling proportion" were the low faculty salaries and the
frequent incapacity of these institutions to move their students through
the normal progression to a college degree.ca There was even evidence
that four years at a Negro college was harmful to the achievement of
53. Meredith v. Fair, 305 F-2d 348, 352 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962): "As
a matter of law, the principle of 'deliberate speed' has no application at the college level;
time is of the essence."
54. Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control of Florida, 350 US. 413 (1956).
55. D. RyasbuN & C. JExcas, THE AcADaNtxc REvOLUTIoN 433 (1968). Not surprisingly,
when this evaluation first appeared in 37 HAnv. ED. REv. 3 (1967). it produced a storm
of controversy, See G. Wright, B. Mays, H. Gloster, and A. Dent, The American Negro
Colleges: A Reply to Riesman and Jencks, 37 HARV. ED. REv. 451 (1967). Two other recent
studies have been slightly less critical of the Negro colleges, though they, have concurred
with most of Riesman and Jencks' conclusions. McGRAT, supra note 44, at 5; A. JAFFE,
AV. ADAmS &: S. MEYERs, NEGRO HIcER EDUCATON IN TE 1960'S 122 el seq. (1963). Ries-
man and Jencks have been most criticized for their tendency to: (1) lump all public and
private Negro colleges together and then make generalizations which compare the "average
Negro college" with the very best white institutions; and (2) ignore the importance of
black students' search for a racial and cultural identity. See Briggs, Keep the Negro Col-
leges, 4 SouTmmmN ED. RxE'., March, 1969 at 41; Jacobson, Negro Student Editors IWant
"Black" Institutions, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED., June 10, 1968, at 3, col. 4.
56. RiEsmAN & JENcKS 422, 429, 432, 437, 471.
57. RsEsirI 8& JENcs 431, 455. "[T]he great majority of Negro institutions stand near
the end of the academic profession in terms of student aptitudes, faculty competence, and
intellectual ferment." Id. at 428.
58. U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPpoRTuNrriy (19B) [herein-
after cited as CoLmAN REPORT]. These thirteen factors were: student-faculty ratio, per
cent of faculty with earned doctorates, per cent of students from within the state, faculty
salary mean, expenditure per student, room cost, presence of a Phi Beta Kappa chapter,
presence of American Association of University Professors chapter, tuition and fees,
library resources, size of student body, freshman/senior ratio, and freshman/student body
ratio. Id. at 368-369.
59. Id. at 417.
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blacks as compared to that of whites who had spent an equivalent period
at a white college; in the case of education majors, results of non-verbal
reasoning tests, mathematics tests, science tests, and social studies tests
indicated a widening gap between the races from the first to the final
year of college. 0 In an intensive survey in 1967, the Southern Regional
Education Board found that the public Negro colleges and universities
as a group did not match their predominantly white counterparts in
admissions standards, breadth and depth of curricula, quality of in-
struction, and preparation for employment."1 Graduates of these institu-
tions often find their degree "a hollow symbol," the SREB concluded.02
The states' insistence on maintaining a "separate" system for blacks
has been marked by a determination that this system not be "equal" to
the white institutions of higher education.
C. Psychological and Cultural Value of the
Historically Negro Colleges
In Brown I, the Supreme Court held that state-enforced racial separa-
tion in the public schools ensured black children an education inher-
ently unequal to that received by white children. The Court also em-
phasized that such segregation created in black children "a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."0 3 The problem
of integration in higher education is complicated by the fact that it is
increasingly apparent that the Negro colleges have an important part
to play in erasing the stigma of inferiority 4 which decades of legal
segregation has produced in many black children.0 5 These colleges by
necessity have filled the role of the Fordhams, Brandeises, and Notre
Dames of other ethnic minorities; 0 they have prevented the assimilative
60. Id. at 344-345.
61. SOUTHERN REGIONAL EDUCATION BoAsD, THE NEGRO AND HIGIHER EDUCAT ION IN vllr
SouTn (1967), quoted in Campbell, Negro Colleges Have a Job, 3 SOUTHERN ED. REP.,
November, 1967 at 3.
62. Id. at 4.
63. 347 US. 483, 494 (1954).
64. Cf. T. LEMELLE AND IV. LEMELLE, Tim BLAcr COLLEGE: A STRATEGY FOR RELEVANcY
28 (1969): "We are only now beginning to admit the existence of a cheated black Anerican
society with special problems and distinct educational needs."
65. See Pettigrew, A Social Psychological View of the Predominately Negro College, 36
J. NEGRO ED. 274 (1967), and Knoll, Colleges: The Nezo Mood of Blackness, SOUTIIERN ED.
REP., July-August, 1968, at 17. Cf. E. ERICKSON, IDENTITY, YOUTH, AND CRIsis 42 (1968):
"Desegregation, compensation, balance, reconciliation-do they not all sometimes seem
to save the Negro at the cost of an absorption which he is not sure will save mutdi of
himself?" Whitney Young, no separatist, has noted the value of the Negro colleges as
"centers of cultural influence." IV. YOUNG, To lBE EQUAL 133 (1964).
66. Cf. RIESMAN & JENCKS, supra note 55, at 452: "Like every minority group, Negroes
need institutions they can call their own and in the American context a college is one
of the most serviceable institutions a special interest group can have. . . . It provides
a platform from which ethnic leaders can speak with more legitimacy than most."
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death of Afro-American culture and have preserved "an identity beyond
color that [is] cultural.' ' 7 A recent study has analyzed the crucial role
of these colleges in creating "a positive sense of proud black identity
[that is able to] erode the debilitating feelings of inferiority that have
hamstrung the black American psychologically and thereby make in-
effective the lingering anti-black feelings of racial bigots."' s It would
be possible to apply the Green standard literally to higher education
and to set up actual race mixing as the only test of compliance with
Brown. However, the important psychological value of these colleges
in correcting the cultural lobotomy of past second class citizenshipl'
would be demolished by instant racial homogenization. It would be a
perverse misreading of Brown I to sacrifice, in the name of "equal
educational opportunity," the most effective means of overcoming the
stigma of racial discrimination.,0
D. Value of the Historically Negro Colleges in Providing Remedial
Education for Black Students
Despite frequent academic inferiority to similar white institutions,
the Negro colleges provide the only opportunity for many black stu-
dents in the South to obtain higher education. This remedial function
is a result of the relative poverty of many black students, the academic
inferiority of many Negro high schools, and the racial separateness of
Southern higher education. Abolition or rapid assimilation of the Negro
colleges would probably abolish this function because such students
would have to compete with whites from (on the average) superior high
schools. 71 Such an "equality" is Orwellian.
Experience demonstrates that when existing Negro institutions are
dismantled, many black students are unable to gain admission else-
where. For example, Florida abolished its Negro junior colleges be-
tween 1962 and 1965, and although special provision was made for
67. LEME.LE & LEIMrLE, supra note 64, at 34.
68. Id. at 132.
69. See Henderson, The Role of the Predominantly Negro Institulions, 36 J. Ntocro
ED. 266 (1967), and Campbell, Negro Colleges Have a Job, 3 SoUTHERN ED. Rrn., November,
1967, at 3.
70. The LeMelle study concluded that of the "several means available to the black
American community for achieving the positive black consciousness . . . necessary for
establishing relevant and effective black/white interdependence," black higher education
provides the best "operational blueprint" because: (1) it is still largely controlled imme-
diately by black Americans; (2) it has the largest and most available concentration of
means for effectively politicizing the black community; (3) it has the most immediate
access to the black youth whose task it will be to make this interdependency a reality.
LEMELL & LEMErL, supra note 64, at 13-14.
71. None of the three recent studies of the Negro colleges has taken the viewv that they
should be dismantled; all concur that many of them should be strengthened, while others
should alter their scope by becoming junior colleges or by specializing in remedial educa-
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black students in the new system, there has since been a drastic de-
cline in the number of black students enrolled in the consolidated
junior college system.72 Evidence in the Sanders case indicated that if
the white institutions in the Nashville area had set an entrance require-
ment of a score of 16 on the American College Testing Program (ACT)
composite tests (the score supposedly indicating the minimum ability
to perform acceptably in college), 78% of the Tennessee A & I freshmen
would not have been admitted. The mean score of the freshman classes
at the historically white institutions ranged from 18.3 at Austin Peay
State University to 22.0 at the University of Tennessee Nashville Cen-
ter; the mean score at Negro Tennessee A & I was 11.913
Ironically, even the mediocre education provided at the public Negro
colleges is a kind of subsidy for black students. Many black students
benefit from the perpetuation of this system because they would be
unable to qualify for admission under a color-blind admissions standard
when whites were also competing for admission. Thus, McGrath has
concluded that "the closing of the weaker institutions would deprive
thousands of Negro youth of any opportunity for higher education" 14
Also, these colleges have developed special skills in remedial education.
Because they have been close to the problems of black students and
have developed experience in dealing with these problems, they have
established patterns that give them a great advantage, psychologically
and organizationally, for the huge task of correcting the educational
damage produced by inferior Negro high schools. 5
tion, RSMAN& JENCKS, supra note 55, at 452; JArfE, ADAms 8& MaimtLs, supra note 55, at
128; McGRATH, supra note 44, at 159. "The view that many of the predominantly Negro
colleges ought to be closed . . . springs from a false notion of academic excellence antd
supports a policy in conflict not only with the rights of many disadvantaged youths, but
also with the public interest . .. Unless relatively inexpensive and local higher educa-
tion is available, hosts of potentially eligible Negro youth will be denied any educational
opportunity beyond high school." McGRATH at 160.
72. Marsh, Junior Colleges and Negroes, 4 SOUTHERN ED. RE'., September, 1968, at 10.
There has not been a significant increase in the number of blacks enrolled In four-year
colleges during this period either. Id.
73. 288 F. Supp. at 940.
74. McGRATH, supra note 44, at 8.
75. F. GOLDMAN, EDUCATIONAL IMPERA .TIvE: THE NEGRO IN THE CHANGING Sourit 2 (1963).
For the present and potential value of these institutions in providing remedial education
for academically deprived Negro high school graduates, see MCGRATH, supra note 44, at
53, and Wiggins, Dilemmas in Desegregation in Higher Education, 35 J. NEGRO ED. 430
(1966). "[In the next decade, there will be] a shift in the conception of education from a
status-giving and selective system that develops each individual to his highest potential.
. [W]hat is now required is not equality of access to education . . . but a system of
compensatory education which can prevent or overcome earlier deficiencies in the develop-
ment of each individual." K. BLOOM, V. DAVIS 8L R. Hrss, COMPENSATORV EDUCATION F0R
CULTURAL DEPRIVATION 285 (1965).
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III. The Scope of the Duty in Higher Education
The question of whether the state must do more than enforce racially
non-discriminatory admissions policies involves the basic meaning of
the Brown mandate. Brown may be interpreted to require only a non-
discriminatory admissions policy, to require instantaneous integration
of all state colleges and universities, or to require that colleges comply
with some set of intermediate standards that encourage integration but
do not necessarily produce it immediately.
A. The Requirement of Racially Non-discriminatory
Admissions Policies
In Green, the New Kent County School Board argued not that it was
desegregating fast enough, but that it had desegregated completely be-
cause black students were provided a chance to attend white schools.
Although the Supreme Court rejected this argument, Alabama and
Tennessee also argued, in the ASTA and Sanders cases, that they were
complying with Brown because their colleges maintained racially non-
discriminatory admissions policies. However, it is clear that such policies
are a mere genuflection to Brown and that many of the problems that
triggered the Green decision exist in higher education also; the severity
of racial isolation and the general inferiority of the Negro colleges have
already been noted.76 The Southern colleges which are predominantly
black today were founded by the states for Negroes only;7 7 although
the laws enforcing segregation at these institutions were declared uncon-
stitutional sixteen years ago, the state is as responsible in higher educa-
tion as in elementary/secondary education for the attendance patterns
originally established by de jure segregation which now condition stu-
dent choice of institutions of higher education.78 The continued exis-
tence of such patterns indicates that de jure segregation has not been dis-
76. See pp. 673-76 supra.
77. See p. 674 supra.
78. The constitutional problem of finding state action in de facto segregation is not
presented in Southern higher education. The conventional definition of "de fure' and
"de facto" segregation is stated in Taylor v. Bd. of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181, 194 n.12
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961): "'(D]e jure'
should refer to segregation created or maintained by official act, regardless of its form.
'De facto' should be limited to segregation resulting from fortuitous residential patterns."
Most courts have interpreted Brown I's "Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal," 347 US. at 495 (1954), to apply only to instances where there has been a past
history of de jure segregation or where there has been some affirmative discriminatory
action by the school board (such as racial gerrymandering or racial favoritism in allowing
transfers). Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 924 (1964).
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established; the national commitment to extirpating such segregation,
declared in Brown, is being dishonored and disobeyed.
The stringency of past judicial action to "desegregate" higher educa-
tion has been noted.79 The fact that a stricter requirement than the
"all deliberate speed" of the contemporaneous elementary/secondary
education cases was enforced in the area of admissions in higher educa-
tion seems to raise the inference that if affirmative action to encourage
integration is required in elementary/secondary education, something
more than racially non-discriminatory admissions policies will be re-
quired in higher education. Differences from elementary/secondary
education, however, may affect the scope of this affirmative duty in
higher education, continued application of the limited ASTA rule of
nondiscriminatory admissions policies will conjure once again the
ghost of Briggs v. Elliott to walk abroad and turn the principles of the
Fourteenth Amendment against their intended beneficiaries.
B. The Requirement of Immediate Integration
The Brown mandate for higher education might be interpreted as
Green defined it for elementary/secondary education: the state is re-
quired to achieve immediately a unitary nonracial system of higher
education. It would be possible to achieve almost instantaneous racial
homogenization through some kind of centralized state admissions sys-
tem to which students applied and from which they were assigned par-
ticular colleges. However, such a process would eliminate the cultural
and non-academic differences among colleges which are the result of
cumulative student choice of an institution because it represents certain
values. By abolishing these fragile "qualities which are incapable of
objective measurement,"80 such a system would extinguish the tradi-
tional values of the black colleges as curators of Afro-American cul-
ture;8' this would frustrate the wishes of many black students who wish
to attend these colleges because they view them as a means of counter-
acting the lingering stigma of racial discrimination.
A centralized admissions system could either be strictly color-blind
or it could include a quota system for educationally disadvantaged black
students. In addition to obliterating the psychological/cultural func-
tions of the Negro colleges noted above, these techniques would raise
further problems.
79. See p. 671 supra.
80. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
81. LEMELIz & LEMETL, supra note 64, at 35 compares them to the "isolated monag-
teries of the European Dark Ages."
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A state-wide color-blind admissions standard would put whites and
blacks in direct competition and would thus destroy the remedial func-
tion of the Negro colleges. A class of "push-outs" would be created
because many of the black students now in the Negro colleges would
be rejected as academically unacceptable in a fully integrated and
competitive system.
8 2
A state-wide admissions system which attempted to achieve integra-
tion through some kind of a quota system would create the administra-
tive difficulties of setting quotas, of determining how compensatory the
standards would be as black high schools improved and became more
integrated, and of adjusting the quotas as student preferences changed.
Such a quota system would be handicapped by its inability to compul-
sorily assign students to specific academic programs; it would be possible
to give a student the remedial education to become an engineer, but a
student who wished to become an engineer could not be forced to be-
come a teacher instead. Also, it has been suggested that such benevolent
quotas may be unconstitutional; denial on the basis of race of an ac-
ademically qualified white student's application to a state institution
of higher education might violate the Equal Protection Glause.8
The ASTA court felt that it could not utilize the techniques of
geographical zoning, school pairing, and busing (all used in lower
education) to integrate Alabama's state colleges, because the colleges
were not evenly distributed geographically and were dissimilar in the
academic functions they performed. Holding that Green applied di-
rectly to higher education, the court asserted, would have necessitated
ordering a centralized admissions system which would abolish free
student choice of institutions. For the administrative reasons described
(but without considering the remedial and psychological/cultural values
of the Negro colleges), the court declined to order such a plan. How-
ever, the assumption that requiring more of a state than non-discrim-
inatory admissions necessarily means instituting some kind of a state-
wide student compulsory assignment plan is false.84 A set of "judicially
82. See pp. 677-78 supra.
83. See A. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 61-65 (1952). But see Freund, Ded-
ication-1964: Constitutional Dilemmas, 45 Boston U.L. ME%,. 13, 20 (1965).
84. Frequently, courts and commentators have erroneously equated imposition of an
affirmative duty with abandonment of "freedom-of-choice" in higher education. Note, 82
HARv. L. REV. 1757 (1969), asserts: "Doctrinal considerations indeed may warrant a
complete abandonment of the affirmative duty concept on the college level," id. at 1759,
because "[e]ven if in principle.., one is willing to allow the imposition of an affirmative
duty there may be valid educational considerations, as Judge Johnson pointed out in
Alabama State Teachers, which argue for maintenance of the free choice system." Id. at
1761. judge Johnson rejected the applicability of Green to higher education because he
apparently felt it would necessarily mean abandoning freedom-of-choice: "Freedom to
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discOverable and manageable" standards83 Can be devised which requires
the state to take a more active role in the integration of higher ed-
ucation but which leaves untouched the Pelagian virtues of the present
system of student allocationi, The ultimate goal is to eradicate the lin-
gering effects of past de jure segregation which inhibit free student
choice among institutions of higher education.
IV. Philosophy and Prescription
A. Proposed Standards: Assumptions, Operation, Results
The following minimal standards are suggested to evaluate state
efforts to desegregate higher educational institutions in the light of the
Green decision. In state systems of higher education once racially seg-
regated by law, student admissions policies must be free of racial dis-
crimination; in addition, the state has the duty to:
(1) equalize per pupil expenditures on similar kinds of institutions
insofar as such institutions are racially distinguishable;
(2) make positive efforts to alter present segregated attendance pat-
terns by influencing student choice of colleges and universities through
recruiting techniques;
(3) insure that the administrative staff and faculty of its institutions
are desegregated;
(4) utilize expansions of facilities and new construction to gradually
integrate the dual system.
These standards embody the assumption that integration of insti-
tutions of higher education is a desirable goal because discrimination
on the basis of race is intolerable and because the present pattern of
segregated enrollment at these institutions is a product of such dis-
crimination. The standards are grounded on the belief that American
society cannot be politically or socially stable if it is split into two
choose where one will attend college, unlike choosing one's elementary or secondary
public school, has a long tradition and helps to perform an important function, vii,
fitting the right school to the right student." 289 F. Supp. at 790.
The NAACP Legal Defense Fund recognized this distinction, however, in its Jurisdic-
tional Statement on the appeal of the ASTA case to the Supreme Court:
Since , . . freedom-of-choice seems an appropriate system for higher education,
doctrine such as the new construction doctrine, which can be used to make freedom-
of-choice succeed in producing a unitary non-racial system, are of particular Impor.
tance in the area of higher education.
Jurisdittional Statement for Appellants at 16 (emphasis in original).
85. Norvalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F,2d 920, 929 (2d Cir. 19 B).
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antagonistic and racially defined factions; s it seems clear that racial
harmony in higher education has a direct influence on the social and
political cohesiveness of the larger society.87 The standards assume that
unless the guarantees of the Constitution are to be rendered hollow
hypocrisies, it will be necessary to take affirmative action to remedy
the damage done by past state-sanctioned racial discrimination; this will
entail both achieving greater integration and providing the kind of
education that will best counteract the lingering effects of this dis-
crimination. Finally, it is assumed that in order to enable courts to
make decisions with predictability and consistency, it is desirable to
devise standards which are as concrete and objectively ascertainable as
possible and which allow compliance to be easily measured.
A more limited duty is imposed on the state in the area of higher
education than Green imposed in elementary/secondary education; these
standards represent, however, much broader requirements than courts
have so far been willing to enforce. In order to preserve the psycho-
logical/cultural and remedial functions of the Negro colleges, the
affirmative duty standard is defined here in terms of practices rather
than results. Under Green, no practices needed to be prescribed because
school boards were ordered to achieve a unitary nonracial system by
whatever means necessary.
The practical effect of the two thrusts of the proposed standards
(toward integration and toward improvement of the historically Negro
colleges) will not be contradictory, although total commitment to either
emphasis alone might subvert the other. Applying these standards, a
court would view the goal of integration in higher education not as
a system where colleges were totally indistinguishable by race but
rather as one where there was substantial racial mixture in student
enrollment at each institution and where there was approximate equal-
ity in terms of state appropriations, facilities, and faculty quality be-
tween what were once "white" and "Negro" institutions so as to make
them both attractive alternatives for a student's choice of college. The
proposed standards are necessarily tentative; if they do not bring about
more integration than presently exists and if they do not effectively
strengthen the Negro colleges, other standards should be imposed.
86. Cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 508 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393
U.S. 801 (1968): "Our common need [is] for the schools to serve as the public agency
for neutralizing and normalizing race relations in this country."
87. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 US. 203, 216 (19-17), Justice
Frankfurter's concurrence declared that public schools were "the most powerful agency
for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people."
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In the short run, institutions will continue to be somewhat racially
identifiable because the black institutions will remain committed to
their own style of education and will have lower admissions standards
as long as the Negro high schools are inferior to white high schools.
But in the long run, enforcement of the standards will erode the
stigma attached to the Negro institutions by decades of separate-but-
inferior status.s8 White choice of black institutions will be affirmatively
encouraged, and admission of black students to white colleges will be
eased. The standards will also improve the quality of the black colleges.
The goals of integration and Negro college improvement will be self-
reinforcing: as more white students choose the Negro colleges, their
quality will improve, and as their quality improves, more white students
will be attracted.
B. Equalization of Per Pupil Expenditure
Despite rapidly growing aid from the federal government and private
foundations, the state still provides the bulk of the operating capital
for its institutions of higher education. 9 Appropriations are objectively
ascertainable and are controlled directly by the state in a way that other
educational policies are not. In elementary/secondary school districts
under freedom-of-choice plans, courts frequently used comparative per
pupil expenditure by the local school board as an indication of whether
black children were being provided an equal educational opportunity 00
88. The Supreme Court's holding in Brown I that segregation in public education
constitutes a denial of equal protection rests on two conclusions:
(1) such education denies Negro children a chance for an education equal to that of
whites by its very nature; the Court analyzed Sweatt and McLaurin and concluded that
the logic of these cases applied "with added force to children in grade and high schoolb,"
347 U.S. at 493-494;
(2) such education causes psychological damage to Negro children by stigmatizing thent
as inferior to white children: "To separate them from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone." 347 Us. at 494.
These two conclusions are separate and distinct, but unfortunately, many later cases
have equated and confused them. Increased white attendance of the Negro colleges Is
necessary to overcome the stigma attaching to these institutions, and this can probably
only occur through affirmative recruiting efforts.
89. F. Heimberger, The State Universities, in R. Momiso4 (ed.), Tin CoNTR nroyIy
UNIVERSITY: USA 62 (1966). See also Reeves, Higher Education and State Tax Policy, 15
NAT. TAx J. 291 (1962).
90. In Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 417 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 391
U.S. 417 (1968), the court found that the median annual per pupil expenditure ($292) it
predominantly (85-100%) Negro schools in the District of Columbia had been a flat $100
below the median annual per pupil expenditure in predominantly white schools ($392) lit
the District. In United States v. Jefferson County Bd, of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 900 (1900),
afJ'd on rehearing with modifications, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 US. 840
(1967), Part Vi of the Final Decree ordered, among other things, that "per pupil
expenditures both as to operating and capital improvement costs" be equalized among
the formerly Negro and white schools.
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In higher education, at a time when "[t]he real key to tie educational
problems of the Negro colleges is money,"91 these colleges are receiving
far less proportionately from the state than are their white counterparts,
and they are spending per pupil about two-thirds what comparable
white institutions are spending. 2 In the U.S. Civil Rights Commission's
1960 study of integration in higher education, 3 average per pupil ex-
penditures were used to gauge the states' treatment of their white and
black students, and gross disproportions were revealed. Louisiana, for
example, had spent $1,123.57 annually for each student enrolled in its
seven traditionally white colleges as compared with $709.37 for each
student enrolled in its two Negro institutions; Florida had just spent
1,079.39 per student at its historically white colleges and universities
and $901.17 per student at its historically Negro institutions.0 4 Over
the past decade, the situation has improved somewhat, but in almost
every state, the public Negro college still receives a harshly dispropor-
tionate share of the state's expenditures on higher education.5 The
state should therefore be required to equalize per pupil expenditures
at similar kinds of institutions insofar as such institutions are distin-
guishable by race. 6
While there is no constitutional requirement that a state equalize
per student expenditures for its institutions of higher education, if
there is a consistent pattern of discrimination against institutions that
were legally established for Negroes only and that now have a pre-
dominantly black student enrollment, this discrimination violates
the Equal Protection Clause because it is racial and not merely ed-
ucational.9 7 After generations of de jure segregation, it "overlooks
91. Bayton, Reflections and Suggestions for Further Study Concerning the Higher
Education of Negroes, 36 J. NEGRO ED. 286 (1967). Cf. the conclusion of the U.S. Chil
Rights Commission: "No other single factor so directly affects the quality of education a
college can offer as its available financial support." UNrrE STATES CoMI.MssIoN oN CIVIL
Rxorrs, EQUAL PROTEcTiON OF Tm LAWS IN PUBLIC HIGHM EDUCATION 103 (1960).
92. McGRATu, supra note 44, at 26. In the latest year for which comparable figures
could be obtained, 1959-60, the average expenditure of the Negro college per student for
educational and general purposes was $888 compared with a national average of $1,334.
Id. The Coleman Report's chapter on higher education documents specific inequalities.
HEW OFFICE OF EDUCATION, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 368-445 (1966).
93. U.S. COasaMMssION ON CIvi. RIGHTS, EQUAL PROTECTION OF TltE LAws IN HIc1irE
EDUCATION (1960).
94. Id. at 104, 114.
95. McGRATH, supra note 44, at 26.
96. This standard should not be applied to a state's bond issues (the usual way of
financing new construction); the complexities of higher educational planning make an
exactly equal growth rate in the historically white and Negro systems both undesirable
and impossible. The standards by which a court should review new construction are
discussed below.
97. While it may take more money to train a physicist than a philosopher, the state
should not be allowed to spend consistently less training its black physicists than it does
training its white physicists. The duty to spend approximately equal amounts on pupils
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realities"08g to say that the state is not responsible for these attendance
patterns or to say that the state is now providing an opportunity for
equal education because the doors of its white institutions are theoret-
ically open. Choice is not really free for many black students; 0 they
have been effectively "tracked" to inferior colleges because the state has
provided them inferior high schools. 00 Though the requirement of
equal per pupil expenditure at similar institutions is reminiscent of the
old pre-Brown separate-but-equal standard, such a requirement has
repeatedly been enforced in elementary/secondary school systems
operating under freedom-of-choice plans.10'
It is clear that a state's overall per pupil expenditure for white and
Negro colleges and universities will not be a useful figure for purposes
of this requirement because so many different kinds of institutions are
lumped together in the comparison. 10 2 In elementary/secondary educa-
of different races has no necessary relation to the duty to integrate. See Coons, Cline,
& Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial
Structures, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305, 355-58 (1969), and more generally Horowitz, Unseparate
but Unequal: the Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1147 (1966).
98. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
99. Of a freedom-of-choice plan at the elementary/secondary level, the Fourth Circuit
declared:
If there is a contention that economic or other pressures . . . inhibit the free
exercise of choice, there must be a judicial appraisal of [the contention] for "freedom-
of-choice" is acceptable only if the choice is free in the practical context of Its
exercise.
Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 327 (4th Cir. 1967).
100. For a study of the correlation of low SAT scores and predominantly Negro
Southern high schools, see Deutsch and Brown, Social Influences in Negro.White In-
telligence Differences, 20 J. SocIAL IssuEs 24 (1964).
101. Part IV of the Decree entered in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267
F. Supp. 458, 489 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967)
ordered the School Board to equalize the formerly all Negro schools with the white schools
in terms of "per pupil expenditures both as to operating and capital improvement costs,"
and a similar order was entered in Coppedge v, Franklin County Board of Education, 273
F. Supp. 289, 301 (E.D.N.C. 1967). Part IV of the Order entered in United States v. efferson
County Bd. of Education, 372 F.2d 836, 900, aff'd on rehearing with modifications, 380
F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967), ordered equalization of per
pupil expenditures at white and black schools and also required the closing of black
schools if it was not feasible to improve and equalize them as the Order required.
102. A state may abolish any or all of its public colleges and universities, but If It
abolished only its Negro colleges without making provision for the students attendiig
these colleges to go elsewhere, such action might violate the Equal Protection Chttwe
on either of two grounds: (1) because enrollment at such colleges is largely black, such
action by the state demonstrates a racially discriminatory intent to deprive blacks of
their opportunity for an education; or (2) because application of an ostensibly non-racial
uniform state-wide admissions policy at all state institutions would constitute an actual
discrimination against blacks (because of the inferior Negro high schools), the effect of the
state's action would be racially discriminatory. A state may not set up educational
requirements for admission to its institutions if the state's earlier action has made It
impossible for a certain class of applicants to meet these requirements. Dove v. Parham,
282 F.2d 256, 258 (8th Cir. 1960). In Franklin v. Parker, 223 F. Supp. 724 (M.D. Ala. 1903),
modified, 331 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964), the Dean of an Auburn University graduate school
was enjoined from discriminating against graduates of a non-accredited state Negro college
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don, the Negro and white schools were theoretically similar (in curricula,
operating expenses, etc.), so a court could confidently assume that in-
equalities in per pupil expenditure in the same school district reflected
discriminatory treatment. In higher education, comparison is also the
key to justiciability, but the comparison must be refined so that a
public Negro college is compared with a public white college of an
approximately similar nature.
10 3
In some respects, it is far easier for a court to review a state's ex-
penditures for higher education than those for elementary/secondary
education, because in the former case there are fewer institutions, the
tax base is the entire state,' 04 and appropriations are centralized. Also,
in the past decade most states have set up centralized planning agencies
because the state was held to be responsible for its colleges' non-accreditation. In Hunt
v. Arnold, 172 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ga. 1959). a requirement that applicants to the Georgia
State College of Business Administration submit a certification of good moral character
from two alumni of the institution was held to be a denial of equal protection because all
of the alumni were white (a result of state enforced segregation).
103. Because of the history and development of the public Negro colleges in the South,
this comparison is not as difficult as it would perhaps seem. Under the separate-but.qual
theory, public Negro olleges were founded as reflections of white counterparts. H. luLLocK,
A HISTORY OF NEGRO EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH 138 (1967). The public Negro colleges
"fell into the same categories as their white counterparts but the adjective 'Negro' was
heavily charged with lower standards." Id. at 184. These public Negro institutions are of
basically three types: land grant colleges, junior colleges, and teacher training col.
leges. In Southern states, there are usually two land grant universities, and these have
basically similar course offerings; usually, one is the state university (white) and one is
an A & M or A & I university (Negro). Junior colleges are another distinctive type of
institution; here, a comparison of per pupil expenditures at Negro and white junior
colleges will be an accurate indication of whether a state is providing racially equar
treatment because curricular differences among these institutions are minimal. See
Marsh, Junior Colleges and Negroes, 4 SOUTHERN En. REP,, Sept., 1968 at 10; see generally
JAFFEE, ADAMiS & MEYERS, supra note 55, at 98-117. It is somewhat more difficult to find
white equivalents for the Negro colleges set up to provide teacher training and a liberal
arts curriculum; however, the standards of comparison for each such Negro college should
be the public white college whose total curriculum is most similar to that of the Negro
college.
Appendix G of U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS Co,,niissION, EQUAL PROTECTION OF TIlE LAWS 1
HIGHER EDUCATION (1960) demonstrates the feasibility of such comparisons; here, the
white and Negro public institutions of each state are analyzed and compared in terms of
curriculum offered, highest level of offering, and special programs offered. As an example
of how the suggested standard could be applied, the following per pupil expenditures
comparison could be made for Mississippi:
(1) land grant Alcom A & Mf (Negro)-land grant Mississippi State College (white);
(2) the average per pupil expenditures at the state's fourteen white junior colleges
with that at the state's four Negro junior colleges; (3) Delta State College (white)-
Jackson State College (Negro). Id. at Appendix G, table 5.
104. For this reason, a case involving appropriations for higher education should be
distinguished from Mclnnis et al. v. Ogilvie, 293 F. Supp. .327 (N.D. I1. 1968S), a/I'd, 394
U.S. 322 (1969). In this case, a three-judge court for the Northern District of Illinois
held that the state had no constitutional duty to equalize per pupil expenditures among
its school districts. The constitutionality of financing elementary/secondary education by
local property taxes was thus upheld even though some schol districts would receive
proportionately less money than others because their total property valuation was
proportionately lower. Such a rationale would clearly not apply here because appro-
priations for higher education come from taxes that are levied on a state-wide basis.
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for higher education to supervise requests for appropriations, coordinate
the state's graduate and professional programs, and plan the expansion
of the state's public colleges and universities.1°o
Equalizing per pupil expenditures at similar kinds of institutions
will certainly not solve all of the financial problems of the Negro col.
leges. The trust funds of the white institutions will still be larger,
because of larger alumni donations, longer existence (in most cases), and
past discriminatory allocation of state revenues. Also, because of the
past disadvantage and deprivation of both Negro colleges and Negro
college students, equality of educational opportunity will not be guar-
anteed merely by equalizing state appropriations.10 6 However, funds
from the federal government10 7 and from private foundations108 may
be used to fill the "discrimination gap."' 0  Even though the comparisons
105. These groups have been called "the emerging hierarchy of supra-university
institutions." J. PERKINS, Tim UNIVERSITY IN TRANSITION 66 (1966). See Millet, State
Planning for Higher Education, 46 EDUCATIONAL REcoRD 223 (1965), and Conant, Shaping
Educational Policy, 38 STATE GOVERNMENT 34 (1965). They have increasing centralizcd
control over appropriations requests for higher education: it is much mote feasible to
adjust expenditures among the various state institutions now than it would have been
ten years ago, Milett, id. 230. Extensive judicial oversight would therefore not be necessary
to enforce this standard. When comparing per pupil expenditures of similar Negro and
white institutions, the expertise of these agencies can also be utilized in determining how
much is spent on graduate and professional programs at a white institution when such
programs do not exist at the Negro college. A weighting of the per pupil expenditure
should be allowed in some cases. Although there will be some inevitable overlap between
undergraduate and graduate programs (graduate students teaching undergraduates,
undergraduates using graduate facilities, etc.), white institutions should be allowed to
deduct certain expenditures (for research, for graduate instruction etc.) before they
compute their per pupil expenditure if similar programs do not exist at the comparable
Negro institution. For the role of the state planning agencies in long range fiscal planning
in higher education, see L. WILSON, EMERGING PATrERNS IN AMERICAN HIhER EDUeA'rON
86-103 (1965).
106. Cf. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES RIOTS, VIOLENCE IN TIle CITY--AN
END OR A BEGINNING? 58 (1965): "The same educational program for children of unequal
backgrounds does not provide an equal opportunity for children to learn."
107. Federal aid to higher education has greatly increased in the last five years, and
much more money is being provided for construction, teacher training, stndent scholarship
aid, remedial programs, and library development; in the past, the great bulk of federl
aid went for research and for student loans. Henry, The Federal Government and
Higher Education, 37 J. OF HIGHER ED. 187 (1966). See HEW, WHERE TIlE MONEY IS:
ANNUAL GUIDE To OFFICE OF EDUCATION PROGRAMS (1969) for a comprehensive list of
federal programs.
108. From 1963 to 1967, the Ford Foundation alone granted over $25,000,000 to
Southern Negro colleges. Strengthening Negro Colleges, 95 ScaoOL AND SocIETY 411 (1967).
See also RIEmAN & JENCKS, supra note 55, at 453.
109. The proposed standard does not require "benign discrimination" to make up for
past inequities. Such a requirement would be undefinable; if the state were required to
"equalize" its Negro colleges at whatever cost, courts would be unable to determine
when this result had been achieved. A gradual realization of the judicial inability to
mneasure the intangibles involved in comparing separate educational systems was n
important cause of the abandonment of the separate-but-equal standard. See Separate.
but-Equal: A Study of the Career of a Constitutional Concept, I RACE REL. LAW Revl.
283 (1956). Courts have, however, consistently upheld special remedial programs to
alleviate past discriminatory treatment in education. See Wanner v. County School l1d, of
Arlington County, Virginia, 375 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1966). A state's voting special "catch-up"
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of white and black institutions will be approximate ones and even
though per pupil expenditure equalization will not completely meet
the Negro colleges' fiscal needs, such a standard will at least provide
Negro colleges far more state funds than they now receive and afford
a more equitable distribution of the state's appropriations for higher
education than now exists.
As Judge Wright stated in Hobson v. Hansen,"0 the "equal" half of
the old Plessy v. Ferguson"' rule is still valid to the extent that it
is a "reminder of the responsibility entrusted in the courts for ensuring
that disadvantaged minorities receive equal treatment" in systems of
public education once segregated by law and still segregated in fact.
C. Fairness in Recruiting
One of the methods by which the dual system is perpetuated in
Southern higher education is checkerboard recruiting. Ascertainable
and objective standards may be applied to the recruiting practices of
state institutions of higher education, but so far courts have done
little in this area. The concept of "discriminatory admissions practices"
has usually been narrowly defined to mean the rejection of an other-
wise qualified application on the grounds of race."- However, in the
plan submitted as part of the relief in the one case that has recognized
an affirmative duty to integrate in higher education," 3 specific recruit-
ing practices were the primary means by which the state intended to
extirpate the dual system." 4 Recruiting is an especially important means
of influencing attendance patterns at Southern colleges and universities
because alumni of such institutions are almost entirely of one race.",
Yet a check of the field reports on Southern public colleges and univer-
sities compiled by HEW's Office of Civil Rights indicates that these
funds to its Negro colleges would seem to be constitutionally permissible, although only
the North Carolina Legislature has done so. See Thorpe, One State's Program for Negro
Colleges, 3 SoUTHERN ED. REP., Sept., 1967 at 29.
110. 269 F. Supp. 401, 496-97 (D.D.C. 1967). appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
111. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
112. Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696, 701 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962).
113. Sanders v. Ellington, 288 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
114. TENNEssEE DEPARTMT.NT OF EDUCATION, PLAN FOR ACHIEvING MEANNGFUL DESEGRE-
GATION OF PUBLIC CoLLEG s AND UNrVERsITIES IN TENNESSEE AND FOR AnOLIsHING A DUAL
SysT.Ea OF HIGHER EDUCATION 3 (Mar. 28, 1969) [hereinafter cited as S.,NDERs PLAN]. The
Tennessee state colleges and universities were to have their recruiters visit all high schools
within their area, make available all types of recruitment and admissions material to
minority group applicants, prepare special recruitment brochures to appeal to minority
students, use interested black students and staff members in the recruiting effort, send
complete information on financial aid to minority group students, set aside certain sums
for financial aid to minority group students, and strengthen on-campus orientation,
guidance, and counseling programs for black students. Id. at 3-4.
115. "Negroes are not likely to seek out colleges of which they have never heard, at
which they are unsure of their reception," W. YouNG, To Br EQUAL 134 (1964).
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institutions tend to recruit almost exclusively at high schools of their
own race. 1
In the area of recruiting, courts should enforce the following stan-
dards;
(1) Universities and colleges shall keep a record of recruiting visits;
insofar as the high schools visited are identifiable by race, an equal
amount of time will be spent at white and Negro high schools.
(2) In their admissions material and catalog, universities and colleges
shall publicize the fact that they do not discriminate on the basis of
race in admitting students and awarding financial aid.
(3) Universities and colleges shall maintain a biracial recruiting
staff.
Compliance with these standards could be easily ascertained. A ra-
cially non-discriminatory recruiting effort will largely obviate the use
of compensatory admissions standards for blacks at white institutions.
Arguments for the latter policy117 ignore the fact that, despite the
inferiority of many Southern predominantly black high schools, there
are also several such high schools which are academically equivalent to
the average white high schools and whose graduates are as academically
qualified as white graduates.118 These black students are simply un.
recruited, and the nonfeasance of white Southern colleges in this
respect is dramatically emphasized by the success of Northern colleges
in recruiting such students."19 By expanding the concept of admissions
slightly, recruiting could be brought within the ambit of the case law
requiring colleges to maintain nondiscriminatory admissions policies.
116. Examination of these records by the author at HEW's Office of Civil Rights, Mar.
18, 1969. At Louisiana State University, for example, the admissions and recruiting staff
are all white, recruiting visits are made only to white high schools, and nowhere in the
LSU catalog is there mention of the fact that the University does not consider race II
admitting students or awarding financial aid: "There is very little contact with the Negro
communty in Louisiana by representatives of LSU." HEW, Compliance Review Field
Report under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for Institutions of Higher
Education (OE Form 7003 9/67) dated Nov. 7, 1968, for Louisiana State University at 4
(filed in Office of Civil Rights of HEW).
117. Cf. Note, Integration of Higher Education in th4 South, 69 COLUMt. L. REV. 112, 121
(1969), where it is asserted that "the absence of Negro students who can gain admission
on a competitive basis" implies that "[i~f admissions standards arc not lowered, an
institution (white) may remain totally segregated." Discussions on this subject frequently
seem to assume that all Southern Negro high school graduates are inferior to white high
school graduates and that all Southern white colleges and universities are Ivy League
institutions. This is not true, of course. Many white high schools in the South are
extremely inferior academically, and many public white colleges have admissions standards
that are as low as many public Negro colleges. See generally K. CLARK & L. PLOTKIN, TjlEp
NEGRO STUDENT AT INTEGRATED COLLEGES 21 (1963).
118. Id. at 18. See also Dodd, The Progress of the Negro in Higher 1hwcalon, 82
J. NEGRO ED. 485 (1963).
119. REsmmAN & JENcKS, supra note 55 at 431.
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This inclusion would merely reflect the obvious fact that colleges and
universities make affirmative efforts to interest high school students
in applying for admission.
D. Faculty Desegregation
In elementary/secondary education, the Supreme Court has held
that it is a denial of equal protection to assign teachers to schools on
the basis of race if this practice is used in order to perpetuate the dual
system.120 A lower court has stated: "[T]he presence of all Negro
teachers in a school attended solely by Negro pupils in the past denotes
that school a 'colored school' just as certainly as if the words were
printed across its entrance in six-inch letters."' 2 ' However, laissez-faire
faculty hiring may be forbidden, and a race conscious allocation of
teachers required 2 2 as a specific mode of relief in the disestablishment
of de jure segregation. 12 3 Faculty desegregation has been asserted to be
more important under desegregation plans involving freedom-of-choice
than under those involving geographical zoning because of the necessity
to present children exercising the choice with alternatives which are
not identical with the two systems which existed under de jure segrega-
120. In Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965), the Supreme Court held that it mas
improper for a court to approve a school desegregation plan without considering at a full
evidentiary hearing the impact on this plan of faculty allocation on an allegedly racial
basis. In Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965), the Court held that students in regregated
schools or in grades not yet desegregated had standing to challenge alleged racial
assignment of faculty. It has been held that the allocation of faculty on a racial basis is
unconstitutional per se-there is no need to prove an adverse effect on the quality of
education; the only factual issue is whether or not race was a factor entering into the
employment and placement of teachers. Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 363 F-0d
738, 740 (4th Cir. 1966).
121. Brown v. County School Bd., 245 F. Supp. 549, 560 (W.D. Va. 1965).
122. Bradley has been interpreted to forbid laissez-faire handling of faculty desegrega-
tion in certain cases:
[Bradley] implies that the accomplishment of that goal [student body integration]
cannot be reached through the free choice of the teachers and that the Board must
exercise its authority in making faculty assignments so as to assist in brining to
fruition the predicted benefits of school desegregation.
Monroe v. Bd. of Commr's, 380 F.2d 955, 960 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
391 U.S. 450 (1968).
123. Dowell v. School Bd., 244 F. Supp. 971, 981 (W.D. Okla. 1965), aff'd, 375 F.2d 158
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967). The court in Dowell also held that the
admonition of the first Justice Harlan in his Plessy v. Ferguson dissent, 163 U.S. 537, 559
(1896) ("Our Constitution is color-blind,') should not be converted into "constitutional
dogma barring affirmative action to accomplish the purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Thus, racial classifications which effect invidious discrimination are forbidden but
may be upheld if deemed necessary to accomplish an overriding governmental purpoe."
Id. The HEW regulations, issued under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, declare:
"[ace.. .may not be a factor in hiring or assignment ... except to correct the effects
of past discriminatory assignments." 45 C.F.R. § 181.13 (1967). For a comprehensive
description of how continued faculty segregation in the elementary/secondary schools of
the South has been used to perpetuate pupil segregation, see U.S. Co u issimo o.v CIviL
RIGHTS, 1 RACiAL ISOLATioN i THE Punuic ScHooLs 67 (1967).
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tion:12 4 "It is essential that the ground rules of the plan be drawn with
meticulous fairness . . . . [F]reedom-of-choice . . . does not mean
a choice between a clearly delineated 'Negro school' (including an all
Negro faculty and staff) and a 'white school' (with all white faculty
and staff)." 1'm
The necessity of a desegregated faculty and staff would seem to be
equally important to the fair operation of what is essentially a "freedom-
of-choice system" in higher education. Yet there are greater difficulties
in achieving desegregation here than in elementary/secondary educa-
tion. Teachers are less fungible, and institutions are more autonomous.
Also, teaching in colleges and universities is frequently combined with
other activities (e.g., research or earning a graduate degree).
One case has held, however, that the state has a duty to desegregate
its college faculties; 126 for the same reasons as apply in elementary/
secondary education, this requirement should be incorporated into the
state's affirmative duty in higher education. If there is complete faculty
segregation which coincides with the historical racial composition of
the college or university, it is clear that the state has been delinquent
in its duty. The more difficult problem, however, is the degree of
faculty desegregation courts will require. In elementary/secondary ed-
ucation, two different solutions have been devised. In one series of
cases, the percentage of black teachers in each school in the system
has been required to approximate the percentage of black teachers in
the entire system for a certain base year. 27 In another series of cases,
a specific percentage formula has been rejected, and a "substantial de-
segregation" goal has been set which includes the requirements that,
when possible, teaching vacancies at schools of one race be filled
124. Cf. Kier v. County School Bd., 249 F. Supp. 239, 243 (W.D. Va. 1966):
[Tio be constitutionally acceptable, a freedom-of-choice plan will impose upon the
school boards additional duties not required under a geographic plan. The ground
rules must be laid in a way that will not discourage desegregation .... [A] greater
emphasis must be placed on faculty and staff desegregation in order to encourage
the pupil desegregation process.
125. Kier v. County School Bd., 249 F. Supp. 239, 246 (W.D. Va. 1966).
126. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), afl'd sub nol,
Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967). "There is no necessity for setting out the factg
in detail concerning the operation of these state colleges (Florence, Jacksonville, Livingston,
Alabama State) since the evidence conclusively establishes .. . that these schools have
been and continue to be operated as if Brown v. Board of Education were inapplicable
in these areas." 267 F. Supp. at 474. The University of Alabama, Auburn University, tile
University of Southern Alabama at Mobile, and Alabama College at Motevallo were not
involved in this case, since they were governed by separate boards of trustees and were
not directly administered by the Alabama State Board of Education, a defendant in the
suit. 267 F. Supp. at 474 n.19.
127. Kier v. County School Bd., 249 F. Supp. 239, 247 (W.D. Va. 1966); Dowell v. School
Bd., 244 F. Supp. 971, 977-78 (W.D. Okla. 1965), aff'd, 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), cart. denlied,
387 U.S. 931 (1967).
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by teachers of the opposite race and that the School Board affirmatively
encourage (by salary inducements, if necessary) transfer of teachers to
schools of the opposite race.- 8
The latter system seems preferable for higher education. It avoids
the rigidity and illusory clarity of the percentage formula (which may be
manipulated through choice of the base year) and would allow gradual
replacement of faculty and the preservation of academically superior
departments at the various state colleges and universities. This solution
was adopted in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education.1 O Exact per-
centages were not specified, but the court directed the Alabama State
Department of Education to recruit, hire, and assign teachers at state
colleges and junior colleges under its direct control so as to accomplish
some faculty desegregation by September, 1967.130
As long as a good faith start toward faculty desegregation is made,
courts should allow a far longer time period for further faculty integra-
tion than is generally allowed in elementary/secondary education; this
will enable colleges and universities to retain outstanding departments
and to avoid the disruption which abrupt massive faculty transfers
might induce.131 Since a significant amount of instruction at state
universities is done by graduate students, the increasing integration of
this part of the student body will result in a progressively more biracial
teaching body. If two state institutions are geographically close to one
another, a court might order courses available only at one college to be
opened to students of the other college for credit. Alternatively, a court
could order that teachers of one institution teach part time at the other
institution. Where possible, either practice would create a greater degree
of biracial instruction without extensive restructuring of the faculty of
either school. This type of relief was actually ordered in the Sanders
128. Kelley v. Altheimer Pub. School Dist., 378 F.2d 483, 498-99 (8th Cir. 1967). If suf-
ficient volunteers were not forthcoming, however, a "significant number" of N egro teachers
were to be assigned to white schools the next year, and a "larger number" the year
after that. An equitable distribution of the teachers with advanced degrees was also
to be considered in making the transfers. 378 F2d at 499.
129. 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), af/'d sub norn. Wallace v. United States, 389 US.
215 (1967).
130. 267 F. Supp. at 484.
131. The faculty situation differs from elementary/secondary education because in
higher education it will often be impossible to transfer faculty without forcing them to
move their homes; forcing such a move may result in the faculty leaving the state
entirely. In elementary/secondary education, teachers can usually be a-signed to a school
of a different race without forcing the teachers to change their place of residence. Also.
in higher education, there is usually a complex system of tenure and autonomous
faculty-controlled hiring. For these reasons, desegregation which progresses by a gradual
filling of vacancies as they occur and by financial inducements to teach at schools of an
opposite race seems preferable to desegregation by an involuntary faculty transfer plan.
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case 132 where four state institutions 33 were within a forty mile radius
of the center of Nashville. 34
E. Construction and Expansion of Facilities
In elementary/secondary school districts operating under freedom.
of-choice plans, site selection for new school construction is of critical
importance because it is one of the ways in which former de lure
segregation can be effectively perpetuated. 135 As part of their affirmative
duty to desegregate, elementary/secondary school officials must plan
new construction to achieve the maximum possible integration; 1 0
usually, this means locating new schools in areas which are not con-
spicuously monoracial. 137 In higher education, traditionally, students
have lived on campus, and so the location of the college has not signifi-
cantly affected the racial composition of the student body. Such a model
is becoming somewhat inaccurate, however, because of the spectacularly
increasing number of commuter students; 1 8 this development has made
geographic considerations increasingly important in the location of new
public institutions. In the South, therefore, although the racial demog.
132. 288 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
133. These institutions are the University of Tennessee Nashville Center, Tennessee
A & I State University, Austin Peay State University, and Middle Tennessee State
University.
134. Cooperative academic programs were ordered to be initiated, with primary
responsibility assigned to one institution for devising single programs to serve the entire
four college area. SANDERS PLAN, supra note 114, at 7. The business administration
faculty at Middle Tennessee State University and the University of Tennessee Nashville
Center were to provide special courses at Tennessee A & I, while Tennessee A & I faculty
members were to teach education, sociology, and Afro-American history courses at the
two white institutions. The chief academic administrators of the three institutions were
to arrange for joint appointments of selected faculty members and for the joint planning
of other course offerings. Special incentives were required, in order to make the joint
faculty appointments attractive. Incentives were to include payments for transportation
costs, flexibility in home campus teaching schedules, and special salary bonuses. Id. at 9,
The two Nashville institutions, Tennessee A & I and the University of Tennessee Nashville
Center, were ordered to "undertake joint recruitment of faculty who will understand
from the beginning their cooperative responsibilities." Id. at 9. Finally, the two Nashville
institutions were ordered to recognize complete transfer of course credits (assuming
acceptable grades) so that a student's registration at one institution would allow him com-
plete access to course offerings at the other institution. Id. at 9-10. To facilitate movement
of students between the Nashville Center of the University of Tennessee and Tennessee
A & I, regular transportation service was to be provided, and course descriptions and
schedules at both institutions were to be made available to students on both campuses. Id.
135. Kelley v. Public School Dist. No. 22, 378 F.2d 483, 496 (8th Cir. 1967).
136. Wanner v. County School Bd., 357 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir. 1966).
137. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (1966), aff'd on rehear.
ing with modifications, 380 F.2d 385, 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S, 840 (1967),
United States v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 395 F.2d 66, 69-70 (5th Cir. 1967).
138. A commuter is a student who lives off campus; the term is often used to designate
students who live at home. Colleges with a large number of such students may expand
more rapidly than other colleges, since they do not have to construct as many additional
dormitories. See generally L. WILSON, EMERGING PATrERNS IN AMERICAN HIGuIR ED.CATIO N
46-71 (1965).
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raphy of the immediate neighborhood of the selected site (so important
in elementary/secondary school construction) is not a factor in locating
new institutions of higher education, placement of a new college or a
new branch of a white university can have a profound impact on the
perpetuation of the dual system if it is located within the commuter
range (usually estimated to be a radius of about forty miles)130 of an
existing public black college. The predictable effect of such action is to
draw off the white commuter students who would otherwise be forced to
attend the Negro college.140 In the border states, substantial "reverse
integration" has been achieved in Negro colleges which happen to have
been the only institution of public higher education within the com-
muter radius. 41
If a new college or university is to be located close enough to an
existing public Negro institution to attract a substantial number of
its commuter students, the court should order the two public institu-
tions consolidated under the same administration and any geographic
separation justified functionally. In such a situation, the state would be
required either to locate new construction on the black campus or
"pair' ' 4- the new institution and the Negro college in order to avoid
duplication of courses and the creation of separate black and white
campuses at the same nominal institution.
There is already precedent for such action. In Bradley v. Board of
Public Instruction,43 the court ordered Gibbs Junior College (a black
institution in St. Petersburg, Florida) and predominantly white St.
Petersburg Junior College placed under the same administration; it was
held that Gibbs should be gradually phased out of existence because
a new branch of St. Petersburg Junior College was being constructed in
139. In the Sanders case, this was the radius used to determine which state institutions
were to be included in cooperative planning for joint faculty appointments and course
offerings. SasDm PLAN., supra note 114, at 4.
140. In the ASTA case, the plaintiffs alleged this to be the states motive in con-
structing a new branch of Auburn University in Montgomery, Alabama. When the
previously private University of Houston was taken over by the state of Texas, most of
the white commuter students who had previously attended predominantly Negro Texas
Southern University (also in Houston) transferred to the University of Houston. rs,,
: JEN CKs, supra note 55, at 470.
141. In 1954, Lincoln University (Jefferson City, Mo.), Bluefield State College
(Bluefield, W. Va.), and West Virginia State College (Charleston, IV. Va.) had student
bodies which were entirely black; in 1967, their enrollments had become slightly more
than half white chiefly because there was no other college nearby. See Allen, The
Possibilities of Integration for Public Colleges Founded for egroes, 35 J. Nsrco Eo. 452
(1966).
142. The term "pairing" refers to a desegregation plan sometimes used in elementary/
secondary education: a Negro and a white school are consolidated, and (for example) the
buildings of one are used for grades 1-6 of the merged school, and the buildings of the
other are used for grades 6-12 of the new school.
143. 10 RACE REL. L RP. 117, Civ. no. 64-98 (M. Fla. decided March 15, 1965).
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Clearwater, ten miles away. The court found that both junior colleges
had racially non-discriminatory admissions policies, but that Gibbs'
facilities were inferior. The consolidation was ordered because if three
junior colleges existed in the same commuter area, blacks would prob.
ably continue to attend Gibbs, and the two branches of St. Petersburg
Junior College would probably be predominantly white.
If the new college or university is located outside the commuter range
of an existing Negro institution, the chances are good that it can be
integrated from the very beginning, but the court should require the
state to show that it is adopting affirmative measures to ensure that
the student body will be biracial. Because of the importance of the
institution's initial "racial image" in influencing future student choice,
a court might wish to attach more stringent conditions to the opening
of the new school than it does to the operation of an existing institution.
Though there would appear to be no theoretical difference between
a new school and a school already in operation, in the elementary/
secondary education cases, courts have seemed willing to impose stricter
conditions on new schools. 44 This may represent a feeling that it is
easier to intervene at the planning stage before faculty are hired and
curricula are set. It may, however, be a recognition that the most
important factor in the success of a freedom-of-choice plan is a strongly
biracial student body.1 45 Since college and university enrollment is
determined by free student choice, the importance of a new college's
initial "racial image" would seem to be at least as great as in elemen,
tary/secondary education, and the court might require that a certain
percentage of the faculty at a new college be black or that special
remedial courses be offered to attract black students. 140
144. Montgomery Ed. of Educ. v. Carr, 400 F.2d 1, 9 (5th Cir. 1968), re,'d on other
grounds, 295 U.S. 225 (1969).
145. U.S. COMMISSION ON Cxvi, RIciTS, SOUTHRN SCHOOL DESEG;REoATION 88 (1967),
146. There are precedents for this in the elementary/secondary education cases. In
Montgomery Ed. of Educ. v. Car, 289 F. Supp. 647 (M.D. Ala. 1968), Judge Johnson found
that the newly constructed Jefferson Davis High School seemed destined to be all white,
and he required it to have a fixed 5:1 white to Negro teacher ratio when it opened (it
necessary the court insrtucted the Board to give an affirmative preference to black
applicants). The Fifth Circuit, however, modified this decree to require only "approx.
imately or substantially" this ratio, 400 F.2d 1, 9 (196). The Supreme Court reversed the
Fifth Circuit, however, and reinstated Judge Johnson's original order declaring that,
in the light of Green, the "more specific and expeditious order of Judge Johnson" was
to be enforced. United States v. Montgomery County Ed. of Educ., 395 U.S. 25, 237 (196p).
In United States v. Jefferson County Ed. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 900 (1966), aff'd on re-
hearing with modifications, 380 F.2d 385 (5tlx Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967), the
Fifth Circuit ordered that remedial courses be provided at white schools in order to attract
black students under freedom-of-choice plans.
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V. Conclusion
Application of these standards will produce more total integration,
upgrade the historically Negro colleges, and preserve the cultural/
psychological and remedial functions of these colleges. The rule that
no student, black or white, may be denied entrance to any public
college simply because of his race will continue to be strictly enforced.
Since in higher education, the goal is not simply a "unitary non-racial
system" but instead a system where there are a number of institutions
serving diverse student needs, the state's duty is defined in terms of
practices instead of results. Because the natural preferences of students
may keep certain institutions somewhat more black (or white) than
others, the simple Green test of achieved integration will not be con-
clusive as to whether a state is fulfilling its affirmative duty in higher
education. The justification for requiring these practices is that they
should eventually lead to enough integration at each institution to
eliminate the stigma of racial inferiority attaching to the historically
Negro colleges and the "colored need not apply" aura of the tradition-
ally white colleges. The ultimate goal is a system of state institutions
where academic superiority is not uniformly traceable to historic racial
classification.
A broader duty than racially nondiscriminatory admissions policies
should be imposed in public higher education because, sixteen years
after Btown I, state colleges and universities in the South are still
characterized by racial separation and a general inferiority of historically
Negro institutions. In the past, when it became dear that the rights
of black students were infringed, the federal courts began to enforce
more rigid standards of "equality" in the pre-Brown higher education
cases and of "desegregation" in the post-Brown elementary/secondary
education cases. Once again, courts must become more actively involved
in the struggle to secure the Fourteenth Amendment rights of black
students in higher education: here also, the time for deliberate speed
has run out.
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